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Abstract
Functional neuroimaging studies of decision-making so far mainly focused on decisions under uncertainty or negotiation
with other persons. Dual process theory assumes that, in such situations, decision making relies on either a rapid intuitive,
automated or a slower rational processing system. However, it still remains elusive how personality factors or professional
requirements might modulate the decision process and the underlying neural mechanisms. Since decision making is a key
task of managers, we hypothesized that managers, facing higher pressure for frequent and rapid decisions than non-
managers, prefer the heuristic, automated decision strategy in contrast to non-managers. Such different strategies may, in
turn, rely on different neural systems. We tested managers and non-managers in a functional magnetic resonance imaging
study using a forced-choice paradigm on word-pairs. Managers showed subcortical activation in the head of the caudate
nucleus, and reduced hemodynamic response within the cortex. In contrast, non-managers revealed the opposite pattern.
With the head of the caudate nucleus being an initiating component for process automation, these results supported the
initial hypothesis, hinting at automation during decisions in managers. More generally, the findings reveal how different
professional requirements might modulate cognitive decision processing.
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Introduction
Decision theories postulate bounded rationality to be the basic
problem in decision-making in a complex environment, assuming
a trade-off between costs and benefits for or against extensive
decision making in situations where information is typically
incomplete and cognitive resources are limited [1,2]. Thus, it is
thought that two options might exist to deal with this problem and
find a resource-sparing solution: (i) relying on an optimization
strategy under given constraints [3]; or (ii) basing decisions on
heuristics, i.e. over-learned habits and hard-wired solutions [1,4].
Both approaches would support the idea of dual processing
theories which distinguish between two systems: an automated,
intuitive processing system which is typically involved in fulfilling
the heuristic approach, and an analytic reasoning system which
alone might be overwhelmed when reaching its analytic processing
capacity [5,6]. Usage of one or the other system depends on
influencing factors such as saliency of incoming stimuli and
availability of resources [7,8]. It was particularly argued that
especially experts make use of the automated processing system by
acquiring respective gist knowledge, whereas novices would need
to rely on analytic reasoning instead. The automated system comes
in handy in situations with equably repetitive decisions which can
easily be based on known rules or categories while it might be
prone to errors in novel situations [9,10].
With respect to decision making, managers may be regarded as
experts since their job, independent of hierarchy, requires them to
decide and to answer for this decision. In its basic ideas, this is
independent of the success of the manager since it is just a basic
job requirement. Overall, the need for fast decisions in the work
environment increased, aggravating the problem of incomplete
information. It was therefore assumed that managers as opposed
to non-managers must have access to respective strategies to
adequately deal with this situation. The manager should be able to
make fast choices with limited information and limited cognitive
resources, but at the same time be as accurate as possible, e.g. by
relying on simplified mechanisms and heuristics [6,11]. Thus, it
was thought that managers might often make use of the non-
rational, intuitive processing system [12–17]. Such processing
approach could be learned [18–19] and might develop by
repetitive confrontation with the same kind of decisions [20].
However, it is still unknown if this strategy of managers has its
neurofunctional correlate in the recruitment of other neural
networks than in non-managers. It has to be noted that this kind of
decision only encompasses one type of decisions required in daily
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work life. Depending on the situation, decisions might be based on
a profound analysis of the complete situation and all available
background information. In the present study, we focused on
decisions which can be based on rules or heuristics due to their
equable repetitiveness.
From a neuroscientific perspective, ample evidence supports the
view of such bipartite processing systems [21]. The two systems
were described with differing attributes: deliberative vs. affective
system [22], long-run vs. short-run player [23], controlled vs.
automatic [24], or controlled vs. emotional [25]. Irrespective of
the respective label, it was assumed that for decision-making both
systems interact: the affective or automatic system was assumed to
be the standard operating system, being only overruled by the
control system if necessary (e.g. bad outcome, suboptimal decision
processes). Depending on the task, different cortical areas are
involved in either of these systems. Typically, areas of the lateral
and medial prefrontal cortex were found to be activated during
decision-making tasks [35,36]. Additional activations are found in
occipital, parietal, and temporal areas for stimulus processing (e.g.
visually presented stimuli) and for preparation for decision-making
[28–31]. For categorization of stimuli, the relevance of a loop
between prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia was stressed [32–
34]. Nevertheless, it still remains elusive how other factors might
influence the use of either system, especially with respect to
adaptation to new situations [21].
In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study, we thus analyzed how neural processing mechanisms for
decision-making might be influenced by the expertise of decision-
making. The line of argumentation is based on theories of social
psychology, decision making, and leadership, as well as knowledge
about neural processes during decision making (Fig. 1). We tested
managers (as expert decision-makers) and non-managers on a
repetitive abstract decision-making paradigm on word pairs. Such
a paradigm assured that both groups had comparable starting
conditions, i.e. a new situation which does not typically occur in
daily life.
Results and Discussion
Behavioural analysis
Fast decision-making was assessed in managers and non-
managers using a repetitive, forced-choice paradigm on 540 word
pairs. Words represented basic moral values of either individual-
istic or collectivistic category [35]. In this abstract decision-making
setting (as opposed to real-world complex decision scenarios)
subjects were instructed to spontaneously select the most appealing
word in each word pair. Based on each person’s own moral value
orientation, he or she would preferentially select words of one or
the other category [35,36]. Thus, there were no correct or wrong
answers. The rule for a decision had to be found out by the
subjects themselves. This experimental situation resembles deci-
sions in every-day life where categorization rules are not always
externally set, but need to be internally generated by the subjects
to deal with incoming information.
The majority of the managers (35 out of 44) preferentially chose
individualistic words (individualistic/collectivistic: 304620/
228624, t-test: T1,68=14.40, P,0.001). To account for this
behavioural impact, we focused further analysis on these
individualistically oriented managers, since the neurobiological
correlate might differ depending on the moral value orientation of
a person [35]. As a control group, 35 non-managers matched for
age and gender, and with comparable preferential choices for
individualistic words (individualistic/collectivistic: 278621/
254620, t-test: T1,68=4.83, P,0.001), were recruited. Managers
and non-managers did not differ with regard to IQ (managers/
non-managers: 127611/124612, t-test: T1,68=21.18 P=0.24)
or educational level (level of school education: U1,68=0.1429,
P=0.8674; level of professional training: U1,68=0.0857,
P=0.9995; Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test [28]).
In order to test for behavioural effects which might provide a
first hint on differential decision processing in managers as
compared to non-managers, there were two available data sets: (i)
the number of choices for either word category; (ii) the reaction
times. Comparing the choice counts between both groups showed
a significant interaction effect between word category (individu-
alistic vs. collectivistic) and group (managers vs. non-managers):
The difference between choices of individualistic and collectivistic
words is larger in managers than in non-managers (F1,136=51.79,
P,0.001, two-way ANOVA). Analysis on the single word level
revealed preponderant choices for individualistic words such as
‘success’, ‘autonomy’, ‘competence’, ‘performance’, ‘risk-taking’,
‘determination’, ‘respect’ or ‘challenge’ for the managers as
compared to the non-managers. Analysis of the response times
(RT) during decision-making revealed significantly shorter RTs for
preferred (individualistic) vs. non-preferred (collectivistic) word
category (F1,136=60.63, P,0.001, two-way ANOVA; Fig. 2)).
This effect was mainly driven by the managers as revealed by a
significant interaction effect (F1,136=16.18, P,0.001, two-way
ANOVA): managers had a more pronounced RT difference
between preferred and non-preferred choices than the non-
managers.
Both these analyses point in the same direction: managers seem
to have been able to more clearly sort out the words of the
preferred category, with regard to the absolute number of choices
as well as to the speed of processing. It is important to note that
managers did not generally make faster decisions, but were
particularly faster when deciding for a more familiar, preferred
category. Since the task was to select the most appealing word in
each word pair, the managers might have found a more efficient
way of sorting the presented words. This might have enabled them
to faster decide for their preferred category. Taken together, these
behavioural findings provide first support for the hypothesis that
managers might rely on a different decision processing system.
This could be a clear heuristic which allows them to clearly
categorize the presented words and to extract the preferred ones,
indicating at efficient processing of the presented stimuli.
Neural correlates for decision-making in managers vs.
non-managers
A potential neural correlate for such a processing mechanism
could be the basal ganglia system, particularly the dorsal striatum,
which was found to be involved in categorization of stimuli based
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the main theory strands which
contributed to the study design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g001
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on rules and prior knowledge and thought to resemble intuitive
fast processing [37,38]. This particularly relates to automaticity
learning which relies on the interaction of basal ganglia structures
with cortical areas, especially within the frontal lobe [32–
34,38,39]. We thus contrasted the fMRI data of the managers
and non-managers during performance of the decision task. The
managers indeed showed preponderant activation of the head of
the caudate nucleus (Fig. 3A).
The head of the caudate was repeatedly found to be involved in
habituation learning, which uses rules and prior knowledge
[34,37] to categorize incoming stimuli and select an adequate
response [40]. It provides automaticity and online updating of
information as a basis for rule-based learning [33,38]. Recently,
the role of the head of the caudate nucleus in the generation of
automatic processing could be specified [33,41]: Activation within
the head of the caudate nucleus was found to increase after a short
period of training. This was not correlated with performance
accuracy after extensive training. This finding was interpreted as
follows [41]: the head of the caudate nucleus should be responsible
for initial rule learning in rule-guided behaviour as previously
assumed [42]. Regarding the underlying mechanism, it was
assumed that the caudate nucleus might train cortico-cortical
connections which are the relevant processors of automated rule-
guided behaviour after initial rule learning [43]. It thus acts as
primer for activity within prefrontal cortex, to which it is strongly
connected [44]. It was thus proposed that rule-based automaticity
is initialized in the head of the caudate, proceeds to ventral
premotor and later to dorsal premotor cortex as training is
intensified [32–34,39,41]. The initial rule learning within the
caudate nucleus might be responsible for finding the applicable
rule for a given situation [39,45,46].
The literature on automated processing further suggests that
activation within the caudate nucleus should show a time-related
increase if equable decision scenarios are processed repeatedly
[32,33]. This should reflect a training effect, already after a short
period of training. Increasing activity might additionally hint at the
initialization of the rule-based automaticity [39,41–43,47]. It could
therefore be assumed that the activation of the caudate nucleus
which was found for the managers in the present study might
increase over the time course of the experiment. This would
further hint at an automated decision processing in the managers.
Thus, an analysis of time-related effects within the caudate nucleus
was carried out by implementing a linear time regressor on first-
level analyses of all subjects which we tested for significant
differences on the group level. Analysis of the hemodynamic
response patterns revealed a significant correlation effect with
time: for the managers as compared to the non-managers,
activation within the head of the caudate nucleus was positively
correlated with time (Fig. 4).
The findings of the present study thus suggest that behaviourally
indicated differences in processing speed and number of decisions
for a preferred category might find its neural correlate in the
activation of the caudate nucleus in managers, which might reflect
a more automated decision processing. The managers might have
been using this rule-guided behaviour for fast categorization of the
stimuli. This interpretation is supported by the reaction time
analysis which showed that managers had shorter RTs as
compared to non-managers when choosing a word of their
preferred category. In dual-process theories, such a phenomenon
was postulated: Very familiar concepts or ideas favour the use of a
fast, automated processing system due to easy access to these
concepts [5,6]. Furthermore, the task of the present study was
highly repetitive, providing the same kind of decision 540 times in
a row. Subjects were able to use a rule which was generated
internally by the subjects based on their value preference.
Managers as expert decision-makers would seek to find a rule or
heuristic on which they could base their decisions [6,11].
According to previous studies, this phase of rule identification
would involve the caudate nucleus [33,39,41]. Fully automated
processing, after implementation of the relevant rule, should
involve areas of the prefrontal cortex. This shift of activation from
subcortical to cortical brain areas as a correlate for a shift from
rule initiation to automated rule application typically requires a lot
more repetitions than used in the present study [33,39,41]. How
and when this shift happens in managers and if there are
differences to non-managers, remains to be answered in future
studies.
Contrarily, non-managers relative to managers recruited a
distributed network of cortical areas, encompassing visual,
superior parietal, temporal and frontal areas (Fig. 3B; Table 1).
The way of processing in such a network is largely different from
the processing ascribed to the caudate nucleus. It encompasses
primary and secondary visual and auditory cortices representing
stimulus-driven bottom-up processes. Activation of primary
auditory cortex could have resulted from scanner noise. But
recently, a different explanation was repeatedly assumed: Activa-
tion of a primary area of a sensory modality other than the main
input modality (here: visual) might result from a priming effect,
expecting additional incoming information [30,31,57]. These
processes were complemented by top-down mechanisms account-
ing for regulation and gating of stimulus-driven processes [29,58].
The superior parietal lobule e.g. processes the relevant stimulus
(here, the visually presented words), being then forwarded to
decision- and evaluation-related brain regions [31]. Brain regions
associated with decision and evaluation processes were found
within dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior and
midcingulate cortex (ACC, MCC). Activation within these regions
was attributed to error and conflict detection, and weighing of
alternatives [26,27,29,58,59]. Additional activation within the
anterior insula at the border to the frontal operculum, was
repeatedly found within such networks and assigned the role of
Figure 2. Response time (RT) analysis of managers and non-
managers. Box plots showing mean normalized RTs with percentiles
(normalized by each subject’s mean RT to account for considerable
intersubject variability) for decisions for preferred and non-preferred
value words. Asterisks mark significant RT differences. Note the
interaction effect in favour of the managers (see text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g002
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Figure 3. Significant differential effects of fMRI analysis (cluster-level corrected at p,0.0013). (A) Contrast managers (mng) . non-
managers (n-mng). (B) Contrast non-managers . managers, projected onto sections and rendered surface of the MNI single subject template. Bar
graphs provide mean-centred parameter estimates (i.e. strength of the BOLD response). Error bars provide 90% confidence intervals. ACC anterior
Decision Processing in Managers
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cognitive control with regard to suppression of inadequate answers
[28,31,57]. A comparable diversified network of cortical areas,
involved in rule-based processing, was found in studies on the
development of automaticity in cortical regions, namely from the
first training session onward. Activation within this network did
not change, even after extensive training, which was interpreted as
not being responsible for the implementation of a rule-based
automaticity [33,39,41].
The network activated by the non-managers during the
repetitive decision task of the present study could thus likely be
interpreted as such a primary processing network where bottom-
up and top-down processes complement each other for processing
of the incoming stimuli.
Taken together, these findings of the present study support our
hypothesis that managers, being professionally used to decision-
making, would rely on neural correlates which were previously
linked to automated, categorization-based processing of stimuli in
a situation of repetitively equable decisions. Contrarily, non-
managers seem to involve a network of cortical areas which might
reflect a step-wise processing of the stimuli via bottom-up
(recognition of the stimuli) and top-down (selection of one
stimulus) mechanisms. The present study hints at differential
neural correlates for decision-making which lends support to the
ideas from leadership and decision theory of managers as experts
in decision-making taking a different approach as compared to
non-managers [6,11].
It might be speculated on the reasons for such differential neural
correlates. It might be likely to assume that managers are trained
by their job requirements with high pressure for decision-making
[6,11]. According to decision theory, this training would enable
the managers to approach new situations by finding rules or
heuristics to deal with the incoming information, having only
limited resources for processing [2,21]. But it is also possible that a
manager is already equipped with this ability of rule-guided
behaviour, and thus, becomes a manager only because he or she
has this and other abilities. Based on the results of this study, this
question could be approached in a longitudinal study design.
It has to be noted that the present study employed a paradigm
of equable, abstract, and repetitive decisions. Such a situation
might correspond to tasks of managers which occur repeatedly in
their daily work experience. Contrarily, other tasks might need the
managers to really focus their full attention on it to accurately
carry them out. This might apply to tasks which require creative
and new solutions. Similarly, managers might be good at
identifying task priority. Thus, repetitive tasks, as implemented
in the present study, could be completed quickly and without too
much effort whereas others are more important, thus needing
more attention and effort. Thus, the difference in neurobiological
correlates of decision processing in managers as compared to non-
managers could also reflect a more efficient way of allocating
cognitive resources. Automatic processing therefore might not
generally encompass decision situations per se, but rather selected
decision processes such as equably repetitive decisions as in the
present study. This might be elucidated in future studies.
Reduced BOLD-response
The differential activation of cortical and subcortical areas
between managers and non-managers not only resulted from
activation of the cortical areas in non-managers, but coincided
with a respective reduced BOLD-response of these same areas in
managers. Analysis of reduced hemodynamic responses alone
confirmed this pattern, showing additional significant reductions in
the cerebellum and the right thalamus of the managers (Fig. 5).
The decision process of the managers was thus not only
reflected by preponderant striatal activation. It was rather
combined with reduced activation or active inhibition in cortical
areas which, in interaction with the striatum, might support the
role of the striatum in automated, fast online-updating of
information during a decision process [37,38].
Reduced BOLD-response during task execution has been
repeatedly reported, e.g. during attentional shifts to external cues
[60–62]. This was complemented by findings that adequate
preparation for task execution requires activation of task-relevant
areas [63,64]. Additionally, task-irrelevant areas need to be
cingulate cortex, DLPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, FOperc frontal operculum, MCC midcingulate cortex, SMA supplementary motor area, SPL
superior parietal lobule, A1 primary auditory cortex, S2 secondary somatosensory cortex, V1/V2 primary/secondary visual cortex. R right, L left. Peak
coordinates: Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g003
Figure 4. Significant time-related effect over the course of the experiment within the caudate nucleus (arrow, 3 voxels) for the
managers as compared to the non-managers (p,0.001). Bar graphs provide mean-centred parameter estimates (i.e. strength of the BOLD
response). Error bars provide 90% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g004
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suppressed for successful performance of a task [65]. This view was
supported by findings in patients suffering from traumatic brain
injury which had difficulty to sustain endogenously driven
attention during a task [66,67].
Discussing deactivation patterns or reduced BOLD-responses
during fMRI studies necessarily needs to consider its potentially
related meaning. There is still a controversy due to limited
evidence on how reduced BOLD-response is related to the
underlying neuronal activity [68,69]. Shmuel et al. [70] could
show that reduced spiking activity of neurons was spatially
correlated with a reduction of the BOLD-response. Conversely,
Devor et al. [71] demonstrated that hyperpolarization of neurons
and consecutive deoxygenation coincides with vasoconstriction.
Thus, they proposed that the inhibitory activity of the neurons was
responsible for the vasoconstriction [72], in contradiction to the
former model that introduced reduced spiking activity as the
responsible factor [70]. Consequently, a reduced BOLD-response
in fMRI could indicate either reduced activation of an area or
active inhibition of this area [68].
With regard to the results of the present study, it is thus possible
that the managers actively inhibited the network of cortical,
cerebellar, and thalamic regions or that these areas were not as
active as the predominantly activated head of the caudate nucleus.
Reduced activation within this network might indicate that all
these areas, together with the head of the caudate, were involved
in the decision process. But the head of the caudate was
predominantly activated, potentially in order to initialize rule-
guided behaviour as described in former studies [39,41,43,47].
Since the cortical areas were repeatedly found to be involved in
decision-making and proposed to be essential for further
automation of the decision process [34,43], it seems likely to
assume that this model of less activation in the cortex also
describes the results within the managers.
Table 1. Coordinates of significant activations for main effects of fMRI analysis.
Functional/Macroanatomical label
Cytoarchitectonic label for
cluster T-stats cluster size x y z
managers . non-managers
L head of caudate nucleus 4.62 313 voxels 215 24 12
non-managers . managers
L primary/secondary visual 17/18 4.03 580 voxels 27 266 220
L primary auditory/secondary somatosensory TE1.0, OP 1 4.34 424 voxels 251 221 8
L posterior superior parietal 7A, 7P 4.54 1741 voxels 210 266 52
L frontal operculum 4.43 390 voxels 234 26 210
L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 5.04 481 voxels 240 40 16
L middle cingulate cortex 4.79 843 voxels 28 9 42
L supplementary motor area 6 4.52 28 24 56
L anterior cingulated cortex 3.80 407 voxels 23 36 16
R primary/secondary visual 17/18 4.33 606 voxels 215 265 3
R primary auditory/secondary somatosensory TE1.0, TE1.1, OP 1 4.40 413 voxels 50 226 12
R posterior superior parietal 7A, 7P 4.10 1741 voxels 12 275 51
R frontal operculum 4.84 658 voxels 33 24 28
R anterior cingulate cortex 4.52 407 voxels 8 34 10
Cytoarchitectonic labels refer to areas of the Ju¨lich-Du¨sseldorf Cytoarchitectonic Atlas [48] as depicted in the SPM Anatomy toolbox [49]. Labels of the areas appear as
published: 17/18 [50]; OP1 [51,52]; 6 [53]; TE1.0, TE1.1 [54]; 7A, 7P [55,56].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.t001
Figure 5. Areas of reduced hemodynamic response in managers. Activations projected onto coronal and sagittal sections of the MNI single
subject template. A1 primary auditory cortex, ACC anterior cingulate cortex, FOperc frontal operculum, IPS intraparietal sulcus, MCC midcingulate
cortex, Thal thalamus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g005
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Active inhibition of the areas in the managers would go beyond
this explanation. This would suggest that the managers actively
suppressed cortical and cerebellar regions, with resources concen-
trated on activation of the caudate nucleus as promoter for
automaticity initiation. With the thalamus being the gating
structure for incoming sensory information to cortical areas [73],
managers not only down-regulated the cortical targets, but also the
relay station to regulate input to the cortex.
Both explanations provide further insight on the complex
organisation of the decision process, especially with regard to the
potential automation of reasoning in the managers. Which
interpretation of the BOLD-response is adequate for explaining
the observed effects in the present study remains tentative until
more basic evidence on the physiological meaning of a reduced
BOLD-response is available.
Conclusions and outlook
Our results provide first evidence for two dissociated, but
interacting decision processing systems in expert and non-expert
decision-makers in an abstract, repetitive decision scenario. The
generalization of these findings to other, concrete decision-making
tasks with real-world scenarios needs to be elucidated. Moreover,
the reason for this dissociation between managers and non-
managers requires additional research: The dissociation might
reflect an adaptation effect due to professional requirements of the
job as a manager, i.e. decision-maker [21]. Alternatively, it might
also be caused by different personality or behavioural traits of
persons, suggesting this decision processing mechanism to be a
prerequisite to become a manager.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
All subjects gave written informed consent to the study protocol
as approved by the local ethics committee of the Rheinisch-
Westfaelische Technische Hochschule (RWTH) Aachen Univer-
sity.
Participants
44 business managers (mean age 6 SD =44.3466.48, 22
males, 22 females) participated in the experiment, of which 35 (18
males, 17 females) were included in further analysis based on their
choice profile (cf. Results). Only managers with at least five
directly-reporting subordinates were included in the experiment to
assure that all managers had experience in leadership of
employees. Managers who participated in the present study had
management responsibilities for a median number of 15 employ-
ees (range 5–3000 employees, skewness 4.9, kurtosis 25.6).
Managers were all office managers, coming from different
companies to cover a wide range of manager personalities with
different backgrounds of corporate culture. These included e.g.
banks, consulting agencies, department stores, IT companies, or
research institutions. They worked as group leaders, department
managers or directors in marketing, human resources, controlling,
sale etc. Based on management theory, it is assumed that all these
Table 2. Stimulus words used for the fMRI paradigm (two categories, 18 words each).
collectivistic ‘Zusammengeho¨rigkeit’ ‘Sicherheit’ ‘Menschlichkeit’
togetherness safety humanity
‘Geborgenheit’ ‘Sorgfalt’ ‘Harmonie’
protection diligence harmony
‘Familie’ ‘Loyalita¨t’ ‘Gemeinschaft’
family loyalty community
‘Tradition’ ‘Verantwortung’ ‘Teamfa¨higkeit’
tradition responsibility teamwork
‘Zusammenhalt’ ‘Gerechtigkeit’ ‘Konvention’
solidarity fairness convention
‘Besta¨ndigkeit’ ‘Maßsta¨be’ ‘Geselligkeit’
constancy standards sociability
individualistic ‘Spaß’ ‘Erfolg’ ‘Flexibilita¨t’
fun success flexibility
‘Kreativita¨t’ ‘Selbsta¨ndigkeit’ ‘Wertscha¨tzung’
creativity autonomy esteem
‘Macht’ ‘Kompetenz’ ‘Unabha¨ngigkeit’
power competence independence
‘Status’ ‘Leistung’ ‘Nachsicht’
status performance indulgence
‘Respekt ‘Risikobereitschaft’ ‘Hingabe’
respect risk-taking commitment
‘Herausforderung’ ‘Zielstrebigkeit’ ‘Selbstentfaltung’
challenge determination self-development
Stimulus words in the table as the original German word (in single quotation marks) and as English translation beneath (in italics). Words as used in a previous study
[35], based on value theories [36,74–76].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.t002
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managers have a high need for making decisions in different work
settings. In the present study, one specific type of decision making,
i.e. equably repetitive decisions, was tested as one type of decisions
occurring in daily work life (cf. next section).
As a control group, a total number of 82 subjects with no
leadership experience participated. Out of these, 35 (mean age 6
SD =40.37610.80, 23 males, 12 females) were included in the
present analysis based on their choice performance during
accomplishment of the task in the scanner (see below), thus
serving as controls for the managers. The performance of the
controls should match performance of the managers to eliminate a
potentially confounding factor from further analysis.
All participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric
disease and normal or corrected to normal vision.
Experimental design, stimuli, and stimulus presentation
Each participant performed a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) experiment, using a forced-choice paradigm on
abstract value words [35]. Words were generated based on
psychological value theories [36,74–75], with a main distinction
between individualistic and collectivistic value words (Table 2).
This task was chosen for the present study since it provided an
abstract set of stimuli, independent of a concrete real-world
situation, thus being much more simplified than a real scenario.
The usage of abstract moral values forced the subjects to decide
based on their general value preference. They thus had some prior
knowledge about the different categories of moral values and could
choose in accordance to their own preferences [36,74–76]. The
task was demanding to require constant attention and conscious
decision-making in every single trial. Furthermore, the task
simulated a situation of repetitive and equable decisions as one
type of decision situations in real life.
For each of the two categories (individualistic and collectivistic),
18 words were generated. Due to ambivalent meaning of original
value words, stimulus words were checked for accuracy and
selectiveness using the German Duden glossary of synonyms [77]
and affirmed by speech and language therapists of the Neurolin-
guistics Department of the RWTH Aachen University. Further-
more, as German language is case sensitive, only nouns had to be
generated which were not adjective- or verb-derived to assure
consistency in syntactic word category [35].
Two words belonging to different value categories were
presented simultaneously on either side of a screen (word pair,
Fig. 6). With two word categories, a total number of 36 words were
at disposal. Every word from each category was combined with
each other word from the same or the other category, providing a
total number of 324 trials. Interleaved and randomized across
participants, word pairs consisting of either two individualistic (108
trials) or two collectivistic words (108 trials) were presented as
catch trials to assure equably stable attention over all trials and the
need to decide on each word pair independently. The value words
as used in the present paradigm could further be subdivided into
subcategories of different levels of complexity and close similarity
in value meaning [74]. Thus, these words were not combined with
each other. In total, 540 word pairs were presented. It has to be
noted that differences in neural correlates could only be observed
for processing of the main categories ‘individualistic’ and
‘collectivistic’, without any further differentiation for any of the
value subcategories [35]. Therefore, the present analysis consid-
ered this main distinction as potential influencing factors when
investigating the neural correlates of decision strategies in
managers and non-managers.
Prior to scanning subjects were instructed to spontaneously
select the most appealing word in each presented word pair. They
were only informed on the general design of the study, i.e. that
pairs of words would be presented in a rapid sequence, leaving
them no time to carefully think about their choice. Participants
were naive about the intention of the study to assure impartiality.
Figure 6. Exemplary sketch of the paradigm design.Word pairs are shown as the original German stimulus words (for translations, cf. Table 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043537.g006
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They were instructed to report their choice by button press, using
the right index finger when choosing the word on the right side of
the screen and the left index finger for the word on the left side of
the screen. After scanning, subjects were debriefed. They were
asked to provide a short appraisal of how they experienced the
choice situations during the experiment.
Words were presented as written strings in Helvetica font at
48 pts, with the two words in each word pair being located equally
distant from the centre of the screen. Over all 540 trials, each word
appeared 30 times with 50% appearance on the left and 50% on
the right side of the screen to avoid habituation effects or
preferences of the subjects for one side of the screen. Word pairs
occurred in randomized order, with different randomization for
every participant.
Subjects saw the stimuli (presented by PresentationH; Neurobe-
havioural Systems, Albany, USA), which were back-projected onto
a screen at the back wall of the scanner room, via an angled mirror
suspended from the head coil.
The paradigm was implemented as a modified event-related
design. The whole experiment lasted about 22 minutes. Each
presentation of a word pair lasted 1.3 seconds, followed by a blank
screen period of 1 second, giving a stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) of 2.3 seconds. The short presentation time of the stimuli
was chosen to avoid social desirability biases which might occur if
subjects are given enough time to rethink their answer [36,74–76].
Since linear additivity and general independence can be assumed
for trials with onsets of at least 1 second apart [78,79], the
hemodynamic response of each voxel in the brain can be
decomposed for analysis of the fMRI data. Jittering of the trials
in relation to the repetition time (TR) of the scanner (cf. next
paragraph) was constructed by implementation of a temporal jitter
using distributed sampling [80,81]. Thus, trial durations (2.3 sec-
onds) were slightly shorter than acquisition of one complete MR
dataset of the brain. Therefore, the same voxel was scanned at
different time points during the experiment. This procedure was
chosen to assure equally short presentation times for each word
pair.
Data acquisition of functional and anatomical magnetic
resonance images
The experiment was run on a 3T Siemens Tim-TRIO MR-
scanner (Erlangen, Germany), using a standard birdcage head coil
for data acquisition with foam paddings to reduce head motion.
Functional imaging data were acquired from the whole brain by
using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence for
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (parameters: echo
time (TE) = 30 ms, repetition time (TR) = 2.5 s, flip angle = 90u,
41 axial slices, 3 mm slice thickness, slice distance 10%, field of
view (FoV) = 2006200 mm2, giving an in-plane resolution of
363 mm2). After the experimental EPI runs, a high-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical image was obtained for later normalisation of
the EPI data into the standard reference space of the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI), using a 3D-MPRAGE sequence
(parameters: 176 slices, TR =2.25 s, TE = 3.03 ms, FoV
=2566256 mm2, flip angle = 9u, final voxel resolution:
16161 mm3).
Functional image analysis
Data were processed using MATLAB 7 (The Mathworks Inc.,
Natick, USA) and the SPM5 software package (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK, http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Pre-processing of the data included realign-
ment, segmentation using the unified segmentation approach [82],
normalisation to the MNI single subject template [83], and spatial
smoothing with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
The aim of the present experiment was studying the general
decision processing in managers vs. non-managers. Thus, for the
analysis of the brain activation data, all trials were collapsed into
one condition which reflected the decision process during the
experiment. This enabled general modelling of the relevant
decision processes which were needed to process all presented
decision situations, and thus detection of neural correlates for
potentially different decision strategies in managers and non-
managers. Separate analyses for either trial type (i.e. individual-
istic, collectivistic) were carried out as well, yielding no significant
results. Trials for which subjects failed to answer within the time
frame of 2.3 seconds were discarded from further analysis. Trials
were analysed in a modified event-related fashion, aiming at
optimally modelling the relevant time period of each event,
encompassing attainment of the stimulus, cognitive processing and
decision making [84]. For each event, the duration was set
individually according to the subject’s response time at the time of
button press. Subjects were allowed to respond at any time point
between presentation of a stimulus and presentation of the next
stimulus (2.3 seconds response timeframe). Subject’s response did
not influence presentation time of a word pair which was always
1.3 seconds.
Additionally, a time regressor was added for each subject to
model the course of the hemodynamic response during the
decision process. This allowed assessing training effects due to
longer experience with the paradigm (equably repetitive decisions
on abstract word pairs).
The event-related block functions for each category were
convolved with the hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its
first derivative for a more flexible fit to the data. Assumptions
about single events based on the emerging total HRF could be
made assuming additive effects according to the Linearity Theory
for event-related designs with stimulus-onset asynchrony of around
1 second [85,86]. For each trial category, a baseline contrast with
the implicit baseline as implemented in SPM was used, where the
implicit baseline consisted of all blank screen intervals between
consecutive trials. For response times longer than the presentation
of the stimulus, only the rest of the blank screen period was
included in the implicit baseline.
On the second level for a group analysis, individual contrast
images of both trial categories were entered into a random-effects
analysis. For analysis, a full factorial design was implemented with
factors ‘subject’ (necessary to model repetition as a within-subject
factor), and ‘group’ (either managers or non-managers), using t-
tests to assess differences between the two groups. Coordinates are
reported in standard MNI space [87].
Statistical analysis of neuropsychological and
behavioural data
Neuropsychological and behavioural data were analysed using
SPSS Statistics 19 for Windows (IBM Corp., Somers, NY, USA).
Subjects’ performance during the fMRI experiment, i.e. the
decisions made by the subjects for either word in each word pair,
was tested by means of a two-step cluster-analysis. The aim was to
identify subgroups of either individualistic or collectivistic value
preference [35]. Decisions of each subject during the fMRI
experiment were categorized into either belonging to the
individualistic or the collectivistic word category. For each
participant, the number of choices for either category entered
the analysis (standardized for further analysis during clustering,
Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons; parameters: 15
clusters, log-likelihood distance estimation, clustering criterion:
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Akaike’s information criterion, no noise-handling for outlier
treatment, initial distance change threshold = 0, 8 branches per
leaf node, 3 depth levels). As additional neuropsychological testing,
each participant underwent IQ testing using the short form
(part 1) of the culture-free intelligence test CFT-20 [88].
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